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FELONS, FIREARMS, AND FEDERALISM:




The United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Lopez' suggested a dramatic shift in the Court's' view
of the Congressional power to criminalize conduct primarily
local in nature. Lopez has contributed to an ongoing dialogue
within the academic community, and on the bench, regarding the
future of federalism.3 Unfortunately, as is often the case, the
Supreme Court's new perspective has not necessarily resulted in
a clean break with tradition, leaving lower federal courts to
engage in the complex process of reconsidering the impact of
new precedent on older doctrines. Lopez raises questions, for
example, about the continuing viability of the Court's prior
decision in Scarborough v. United States,4 which addressed
Congress's power to outlaw the possession of firearms by
felons.
As Professor Robert Justin Lipkin has observed, lower
federal courts serve important roles in both the development and
implementation of constitutional doctrine.5  Characterizing
*Assistant Federal Public Defender, Houston, Texas.; adjunct professor of law, University
of Houston Law Center; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; B.A., University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. The majority opinion in Lopez was written by Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ.
3. See e.g. Steve France, Laying the Groundwork, 86 ABA J. 40 (May 2000).
4. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
5. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Constitutional Revolutions: A New Look at Lower Court
Appellate Review in American Constitutionalism, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 1 (2001).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 2001)
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
dramatic shifts in constitutional interpretation as often being
"revolutionary," Professor Lipkin has suggested that Lopez has
the characteristics of a revolutionary decision, dramatically
influencing our understanding of limitations on congressional
power to criminalize local conduct through the traditional
rationale of regulation of interstate commerce.
The post-Lopez litigation history demonstrates, however,
that such revolutionary decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
are not so clean in their application. Lower federal courts are
confronted with new thinking from the Supreme Court, while
working within the confines of pre-existing precedent not
expressly overruled by the Court. This situation has been
reflected in considerable judicial debate over whether Lopez
requires scrutiny of the continuing viability of pre-Lopez federal
statutes enacted pusuant to the Commerce Clause. Perhaps most
typical of the problem has been the continuing viability of the
federal statute criminalizing possession of firearms by felons, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g).7
Prosecutions under § 922(g) are burgeoning. Highly
publicized and well-funded government programs, such as
"Project Exile," have resulted in many thousands of such
federal prosecutions.8 Under federal criminal law provisions,
even a person with a single prior felony conviction-including a
conviction for a non-violent crime such as theft or mere
possession of drugs for personal use, and even if his prior
conviction occurred decades ago-faces up to ten years in
prison without the possibility of parole if convicted.9 If such
persons have three or more prior convictions for violent offenses
or drug-trafficking crimes; they face a minimum mandatory
prison sentence of fifteen years without parole with the
6. Id. at 22-23.
7. That statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [i.e., a
felony] ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
8. Gary Fields, Ashcroft Aims to Step Up Efforts to Curb Illegal-Firearm Possessions,
Wall St. J. A16 (July 3, 2001).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (1994).
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possibility of a sentence of life in prison.' ° Such federal
prosecutions are burgeoning, notwithstanding the existence of
penal laws in virtually every state that criminalize the possession
of firearms by felons and a tradition in this country of state and
local regulation of such matters."I
Relying on the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of
the federal statute in Scarborough that prohibits felons from
possessing firearms that are "in or affecting" interstate
commerce, federal prosecutors around the country are
prosecuting felons whose possession of a firearm was entirely a
local event. Most such prosecutions have no meaningful
connection to interstate commerce. The typical prosecution is
based on proof that a person with a felony record simply
possessed a firearm on his person or in his vehicle.' Many
prosecutions have been of felons who pawned firearms for
money at a local pawn shop,' 4 used firearms to hunt,'5 or
possessed firearms for self-protection." The only "nexus" to
interstate commerce in most such cases is the simple fact that a
felon happened to possess a firearm that was manufactured in
another state and, thus, that necessarily had crossed states lines
at some point in the past.
As discussed below, the prevailing interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)-and the sweeping dragnet of federal
prosecutions spawned by it-far exceeds Congress's authority to
regulate firearms under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution and is at odds with this country's system of
federalism.
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994).
11. The Supreme Court has recognized that penal laws that prohibit felons from
possessing firearms are within a traditional area of state or local concern. U.S. v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971).
12. Scarborough, 431 U.S. 563.
13. The author has handled approximately fifty such cases as a defense attorney. He
has never handled-or even heard of-a § 922(g) prosecution in which a felon actually
crossed state lines while in possession of a firearm or acquired a firearm from out of state.
14. See e.g. U.S. v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11 th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
15. See e.g. U.S. v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1103 (8th Cir. 1996).
16. See e.g. U.S. v. Rice, 214 F.3d 1295, 1296-98 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
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II. THE IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCARBOROUGH
AND LOPEZ
In Scarborough v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court held
that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)' 8 -the statutory
predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)-only required proof that a
particular firearm was manufactured outside of the state in
which a felon possessed it in order to satisfy the jurisdictional' 9
"interstate commerce" element of the statute. The Court in
Scarborough rejected the defendant's argument that a
contemporaneous "nexus" with interstate commerce was
required; any past connection, however remote in time, was
deemed sufficient.2° Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the
Court in Scarborough was written during the era when the
Supreme Court was broadly interpreting Congress's authority to
outlaw criminal conduct pursuant to its interstate commerce
regulatory power under Article 1, section 8, clause 3 of the
United States Constitution.2
In 1986, Congress recodified section 1202(a) as 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). 2 In addition to prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms (or ammunition for firearms) that were "in or
affecting" interstate or foreign commerce, the recodified statute
also prohibited other classes of presumptively dangerous
persons from possessing such firearms.
17. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
18. That statute provided: "Any person who . . . has been convicted ... of a felony ...
and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce ... any
firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both." 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) (repealed 1986). See 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202 (Supp. IV
1986).
19. The commerce element has been treated as a "jurisdictional" element because 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a)-like its statutory successor, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l)-was enacted
pursuant to Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce under Article 1, section 8,
clause 3 of the United States Constitution. That is, the "interstate commerce" element
provides federal jurisdiction over a felon who possesses a firearm. See e.g. U.S. v. Dupree,
258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
20. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 569-77.
21. See e.g. Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding congressional power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate local loan sharking because of the overall effect of
organized crime on interstate commerce).
22. Section 922(g)(1) was first codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
23. In addition to prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, section 922(g) also
applies to other classes of prohibited persons, such as illegal aliens and persons
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In United States v. Lopez,24 the Supreme Court, by a five-
to-four vote, significantly retreated from the Court's prior
expansive interpretation of Congress's regulatory power under
the Commerce Clause in criminal law matters and breathed new
life into the traditional approach to our nation's system of
federalism. In Lopez, the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 199025 as being beyond Congress's authority. 26 The
Court began its analysis by surveying over a century of its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and derived from that
jurisprudence three "broad categories" of activity Congress may
constitutionally regulate:
[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power. First,
Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things [actually] in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce."
In assessing the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, the Court subsequently concluded:
[Section] 922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the
channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to
prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity
through the channels of interstate commerce; nor can
§ 922(q) be justified as a regulation by which Congress has
sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce
or a thing in interstate commerce. Thus, if § 9 22(q) is to be
sustained, it must be under the third category as a
dishonorably discharged from the military. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l)-(9). The vast
majority of prosecutions under § 922(g) are of felons.
24. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
25. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A)
(Supp. 11 1990). That statute forbade "'any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."'
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A)).
26. Lopez, 514 U. S. at 558.
27. Id. at 559 (citations omitted).
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regulation o an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.
The Court then considered whether Congress had the power
under the third species of its Commerce Clause authority to
enact § 922(q). In holding § 922(q) to be an improper exercise
of Congress's power, the Court held:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.
Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.29
In the immediate wake of Lopez, criminal defendants
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) challenged Scarborough's
interpretation of what type of interstate commerce " nexus" is
required under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Defendants contended
that section 922(g), like the firearms statute in Lopez, must be
analyzed as an attempt by Congress to exercise its authority
under the "third category" of commerce regulation identified in
Lopez. Engaging such an analysis, the defendants contended that
Lopez unquestionably established that mere intrastate firearm
possession was not a "commercial" or "economic" activity and
further contended that the mere fact that a firearm had crossed
state lines at some point in the past, however remote, did not
constitute a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce as
required by Lopez for "third category" exertions of commerce
regulation. °
Although no federal court of appeals has held that Lopez
trumped Scarborough,3' numerous federal court of appeals
judges, in dissenting and concurring opinions, contended in a
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 561.
30. See e.g. U.S. v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
31. Every circuit court to have addressed the issue has held that Scarborough has
survived Lopez in terms of its precedential value in the lower federal courts. See U.S. v.
Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586 & n. I (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
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persuasive manner that Scarborough's broad interpretation of
the commerce "nexus" logically did not survive Lopez." Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Will Garwood-the author of
the Fifth Circuit's 1993 decision in Lopez that was affirmed by
the Supreme Court in its landmark decision in 1995 33-cogently
stated that "one might well wonder how it could rationally be
concluded that mere possession of a firearm in any meaningful
way concerns interstate commerce simply because the firearm
had, perhaps decades previously before the charged possessor
was even born, fortuitously traveled in interstate commerce." 
3 4
Remarkably, a total of twelve members of the Fifth Circuit
eventually opined, or at least strongly suggested, that
Scarborough's broad reading of the interstate commerce
"nexus" element is inconsistent with Lopez's more restrictive
interpretation of the federal government's powers under the
Commerce Clause.3' Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has stated
that, as an intermediate federal appellate court, it has no
authority to overrule Scarborough in light of Lopez and that
such action could only be taken by the Supreme Court itself.
36
32. See e.g. U.S. v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 976-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss, J., dissenting
in part); U.S. v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 574-82 (6th Cir. 1996) (Batchelder, J., concurring).
33. U.S. v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
34. Rawls, 85 F.3d at 243 (Garwood, J., specially concurring, joined by Wiener & E.
Garza, JJ.).
35. See U.S. v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1004 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (Higginbotham,
J., concurring, joined by Politz, C.J. & Davis & Wiener, JJ.); id. at 1005-16 (Jones, J.,
dissenting, joined by Garwood, Jolly, Smith, Duhe, Barksdale, E. Garza, & DeMoss, JJ.).
36. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240; Kirk, 105 F.3d at 1015 n. 25. The Fifth Circuit's belief that
Scarborough forecloses lower federal courts from addressing constitutional issues
regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is, however, mistaken. The constitutional issue of whether
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause was not raised in
Scarborough and was not decided by the Court. The briefs filed in Scarborough
demonstrate that the parties in that 1977 appeal were in agreement that Congress possessed
the authority under the Commerce Clause to penalize a felon's mere possession of a
firearm that had traveled interstate at some point in the past; the only issue in dispute was
whether the statutory predecessor to § 922(g)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), could be fairly
interpreted to be an expression of such a sweeping power. See Br. for Pet., at 23-24,
Scarborough v. U.S., 431 U.S. 563 (1977) ("Congress has the power to confer federal
authority to prosecute crimes previously in the state domain [including a felon's possession
of a firearm], and even eliminate the requirement of proof that a particular transaction has a
specific connection with interstate commerce."); Br. for U.S., at 10, Scarborough v. U.S.,
431 U.S. 563 (1977) ("There can be no doubt about the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause to prohibit felons from possessing firearms that have moved in
commerce.... The only issue in this case ... is whether Congress in fact exercised its
broad power over commerce to prohibit possession of firearms that have moved in
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Despite such unrest in the lower courts and the clear
conflict between Scarborough and Lopez, the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari in every case to date in which defendants
sought to have the Court overrule Scarborough in view of
Lopez.37
III. THE FURTHER DISINTEGRATION OF SCARBOROUGH:
JONES AND MORRISON
In 2000, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in two more
cases that set further limits on Congress's authority to regulate
criminal conduct under the Commerce Clause.
In Jones v. United States,3" the Supreme Court, applying the
"constitutional doubt" doctrine of statutory construction,39
strongly suggested0 that the federal arson statute41 could not
commerce when it prohibited possession 'affecting' commerce."). Thus, the parties in
Scarborough did not "join issue" regarding whether the felon-in-possession statute would
operate unconstitutionally in a case where the only interstate commerce nexus was the fact
that a firearm had traveled interstate some time in the past, even if that interstate movement
was long before a felon's possession of the weapon.
Consequently, the Supreme Court's opinion in Scarborough did not address the
threshold constitutional issue. After engaging in an extensive statutory-construction
analysis and review of relevant legislative history, the Supreme Court concluded that "we
see no indication that Congress intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that
the firearm ha[d] been, at some time, in interstate commerce.... Congress sought to reach
possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with commerce occurred....
[T]here is no question that Congress intended no more than a minimal nexus requirement."
Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575, 577. Thus, the only issue decided in Scarborough was
Congress's intent-not whether Congress's expression of that intent, in the felon-in-
possession statute, was unconstitutional. The latter issue was not decided by the Supreme
Court. At most, Scarborough contains what the Supreme Court has characterized as a "sub
silentio" holding on the Commerce Clause constitutionality issue. However, it is well
established that such sub silentio holdings-that is, "unstated assumptions on non-litigated
issues"-have no precedential value. See e.g. Il. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979).
37. See e.g. Chesney v. U.S., 520 U.S. 1282 (1997) (denying certiorari); Kuban v. U.S.,
519 U.S. 1070 (1997) (denying certiorari).
38. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
39. That doctrine provides that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, [the Supreme Court's] duty is to adopt the latter." Id. at 857
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
40. The Court's own "question presented" posed to the parties in Jones made it clear
that the Court was considering invalidating the federal arson statute (on constitutional
grounds) as applied to private residences. See Jones v. U.S., 528 U.S. 1002, 1002 (1999)
(limiting the petition for writ of certiorari to the question of "whether its application to the
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constitutionally be construed to cover the arson of a private
residence based on the mere fact that the residence was
constructed with supplies that had moved in interstate commerce
at some point in the past.42
The Court's response to the Government's proposal that the
federal arson statute should be applied to private residences
based on a "minimal [interstate commerce] nexus"
interpretation of the statute-that is, where components of a
building previously had traveled in interstate commerce-is
telling. In rejecting this proposal, the Court in Jones stated:
Were we to adopt the Government's expansive
interpretation of § 844(i), hardly a building in the land
would fall outside the statute's domain. Practically every
building in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed
with supplies that have moved in interstate commerce,
served by utilities that have an interstate connection,
financed or insured by enterprises that do business across
state lines," or bears some other trace of interstate
commerce.
In order to avoid having to address the "grave and doubtful
question" about whether Congress's Commerce Clause
regulatory powers could reach matters with only a "trace" of a
connection to interstate commerce, the Court applied the
"constitutional doubt" canon of statutory construction and
interpreted the arson statute to require more than the "minimal"
commerce nexus proposed by the Government in Jones."
private residence in the present case is constitutional"). The Court ultimately avoided
having to strike down the statute as applied to private residences by interpreting it in a
manner that avoided the "grave and doubtful question" about whether its application to
private residences would be unconstitutional. See Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
41. That statute provides:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by
means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal
property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and
not more than 20 years. ...
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Supp. V 1999).
42. Jones, 529 U.S. at 856-58.
43. Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 857-58.
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• 41In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court held that
the Violence Against Women Act46-which authorized federal
civil rights actions by women who were sexually assaulted-
exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The
Court expressly held that Congress cannot constitutionally
regulate intrastate non-economic criminal conduct without a
"substantial" effect on interstate commerce, even if such
conduct, when considered in the "aggregate" along with other
such conduct nationwide, would have such an effect:
We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local. In recognizing
this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has been
consistent since the Clause was adopted. The regulation
and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at
the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in
interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States.47
Armed with Jones and Morrison, defendants convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) renewed their constitutional attacks.
To date, although no federal court of appeals has shown any
interest in revisiting the issue of whether Jones and Morrison
have undermined Scarborough, 8 a recent decision by a federal
district court has thrown down the gauntlet. In United States v.
45. 529 U. S. 598 (2000).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
47. Morrison, at 617 (citations omitted).
48. See e.g. U.S. v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Santiago, 238
F.3d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2001). Such cases have attempted to distinguish Jones's reasoning
from Scarborough's broad interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) on the ground that the arson
statute's jurisdictional element required a burned building to be "used in" interstate
commerce, while § 922(g) only requires a firearm to have been possessed "in or affecting"
interstate commerce. See e.g. Santiago, 238 F.3d at 216. Such a distinction based on
differences in statutory language is one without a meaningful difference, however, because
the Government's proposed interpretation of the arson statute in Jones was a "minimal
nexus" requirement, i.e., that a building's components had traveled across state lines at
some point in the past, however remote. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Jones
stated that such a sweeping exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power raised grave
constitutional doubts. See supra n. 42 and accompanying text (summarizing the Supreme
Court's response to the government's position in Jones).
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Coward,49 Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Court Judge
Stewart Dalzell, although finding himself bound by Third
Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that has continued to follow
Scarborough, asked the appellate court to reverse the
defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In so doing,
Judge Dalzell highlighted Scarborough's "legal fiction":
Scarborough may fairly be read to establish the legal
fiction that has prevailed in these cases since it was
announced.... Simply phrased, Scarborough's legal
fiction is that the transport of a weapon in interstate
commerce, however remote in the distant past, gives its
present intrastate possession sufficient interstate aspect to
fall within the ambit of the statute. This fiction is indelible
and lasts as long as the gun can shoot. Thus, a felon who
has always kept his father's World War II trophy Luger in
his bedroom has the weapon "in" [or "affecting"]
50
commerce.
Focusing on Jones's strong suggestion that more than the
past interstate movement of components of a private residence is
required for a constitutional application of the arson statute and
Morrison's clear statement that Congress cannot constitutionally
regulate mere intrastate "non-economic" criminal conduct,
Judge Dalzell concluded that the "Scarborough fiction" was
constitutionally moribund.5'
IV. SCARBOROUGH AND ITS DRAMATIC IMPLICATIONS FOR
PERVASIVE FEDERAL FIREARMS REGULATION
During a recent federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) in Houston, Texas, the Government's own expert
witness" on firearm manufacturing and distribution admitted
that approximately 95 percent of all firearms in the United
States-with all fifty states considered "in the aggregate"-
have been "imported into the state [in which they are present]
49. 151 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
50. Id. at 549 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 549-55.
52. That expert, George Michael Taylor, was a senior Special Agent of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (" ATF"). Agent Taylor, a thirty-year veteran of the ATF,
has testified as an expert for the ATF in countless federal firearms prosecutions.
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across the state line[s]." 53 Such evidence of the huge number of
firearms in this country that have crossed state lines is highly
relevant in assessing whether Scarborough survives Lopez and
its progeny.
Just as the undisputed fact in Jones that " [p]ractically every
building in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with
supplies that have moved in interstate commerce" cast serious
"constitutional doubt" on the application of the federal arson
statute to private residences, the evidence of the huge
percentage of firearms in this country that has crossed state lines
casts similar doubt on Scarborough's interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g).55 Under Scarborough, "hardly a [firearm] in the land
would fall outside [§ 922(g)'s] domain."" The evidence of the
number of firearms that have crossed states lines is also relevant
insofar as the Supreme Court in Lopez suggested that the felon-
in-possession statute should be interpreted to "reach to a
discrete set of firearm possessions that ... have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce." 7 Ninety-five
percent of all firearms in this country cannot fairly be considered
a "discrete set."
In interpreting § 922(g), courts must keep in mind that the
statute's interstate commerce element is based on a particular
firearm's "nexus" with interstate commerce-not on a felon's
"nexus" with interstate commerce." Indeed, a felon's
53. Special Agent Taylor testified that, with respect to "the country as a whole...
about 5 percent of the guns in the average state [in] the country were [manufactured within
that state]; 95 percent would be imported into the state across the state line." Tr. R., Vol. 5,
at 47, U.S. v. Ramoune Lanier Johnson, Cr. No. H-00-733 (S.D. Tex.-Houston Div.) (Jan.
9, 2001). According to Special Agent Taylor, in certain of the fifty states--e.g.,
Connecticut and New York, where major firearms manufacturers, such as Winchester, are
located-considerably less than 95 percent of all firearms possessed within the state's
borders were manufactured out-of-state. Id. Special Agent Taylor's 95% estimate was
based on the fifty states considered in the "aggregate." Id.
54. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857.
55. In the past, without actually having such evidence before them, certain judges have
taken judicial notice that "few guns have never crossed a state line." Kirk, 105 F.3d at
1005 (Higginbotham, J., concurring, joined by Politz, C.J., Davis & Wiener, JJ.).
56. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857.
57. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (emphasis added).
58. Any argument that § 922(g)'s application to a felon's mere intrastate possession of
firearm could be upheld based on the aggregate effect of all felons' possessions of firearms
would be foreclosed by U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) ("We... reject the
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possession of a firearm that has never crossed state lines is not
an offense under § 922(g). 9 With this in mind, under
Scarborough's grant of regulatory authority under the
Commerce Clause, Congress presumably could enact a statute
that criminalizes anyone's purely local possession of a firearm
that, at some point in the past, had crossed state lines and, thus,
"affected" commerce. 60 The suggestion that Congress has the
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause to criminalize all
citizens' possessions of 95 percent of firearms in this country
surely would cause tremendous concern among federal judges
who believe in preserving our constitutional system of
federalism.
Yet the Scarborough theory of interstate commerce
jurisdiction, although it only applies to felons' possessions of
firearms, nevertheless rests on this fallacious reasoning. The
mere fact that § 922(g) is aimed only at felons and other
prohibited classes of persons does not mean that its
jurisdictional element (as interpreted by Scarborough) is
somehow constitutionally valid. As noted, the statute is based on
a firearm's nexus to interstate commerce, not a felon's nexus to
interstate commerce.
V. CONCLUSION
For reasons that are not entirely clear, the Supreme Court to
date has not granted certiorari in order to resolve the
irreconcilable conflict between its 1977 decision in Scarborough
and its subsequent decisions in Lopez and its progeny-the latter
of which clearly undermine the "Scarborough fiction."
Although typically the Supreme Court requires a circuit conflict
on an issue before certiorari will be granted,6' the lack of such a
circuit conflict regarding the proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) is not a valid basis for foregoing review any longer. As
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic ... criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.").
59. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) (1994).
60. Kirk, 105 F.3d at 1005 (noting that the Scarborough theory of federal jurisdiction
would authorize "congressional power to outlaw possession of guns in general")
(Higginbotham, J., concurring, joined by Politz, C.T, Davis & Wiener, JJ.).
61. Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) (1999).
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noted above, each federal circuit to have addressed the issue has
held that, as an intermediate appellate court, it has no power to
"overrule" Scarborough. Therefore, very likely there never will
be a circuit split on this issue. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
own rules provide that, even without a circuit split, a clear
conflict between its own prior decisions is a basis to grant
certiorari and resolve the conflict.
62
Scarborough cannot logically survive the Court's recent
shift in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 63 Although it may
not be popular in this "conservative" era of strict law
enforcement for the Court to significantly narrow the scope of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), 64 an intellectually honest adherence to the
"conservative" principles of federalism followed in Lopez and
61its progeny requires nothing less.
62. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).
63. This article does not intend to suggest that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is facially
unconstitutional. Rather, the language of the firearm statute, like the arson statute at issue
in Jones, simply must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the limits of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause. Such an interpretation must require more of an
"effect" on interstate commerce than the fact that a firearm crossed state lines at some
point in the past.
64. It should be noted that the dramatic reduction in federal prosecutions of felons who
possess firearms that would result from an overruling of Scarborough would not permit
felons to possess firearms with impunity. As noted above, state laws already prohibit felons
from possessing firearms. Congress, consistent with the Constitution, could simply provide
federal funds to states to implement their own "Project Exile" programs.
65. "The Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public opinion, but
from deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular branches of
Government comport with the Constitution." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 963 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by White, Scalia & Thomas, JJ.).
